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Connallon: Integrating the Privacy Tort

COMMENT
AN INTEGRATIVE ALTERNATIVE
FOR AMERICA'S PRIVACY TORTS
INTRODUCTION

In 1991 a Colorado federal court dismissed a woman's invasion-ofprivacy claim against her former employer. 1 In her privacy claim, Hieu
Smith relied on the Colorado Supreme Court's recognition of the
invasion-of-privacy tort a quarter-century earlier in Rugg v. McCarthy,2
which stated, "We do not attempt to comprehensively define the right of
privacy, nor to categorize the character of all invasions which may
constitute a violation of such right. We merely observe that considerable
precedent exists in the area of oppressive conduct by a creditor in
connection with his effort to collect from his debtor.,,3 In dismissing
Hieu Smith's privacy claim, the federal court in Smith v. Colo. Interstate
Gas Co. did categorize the character of actionable invasions by holding
that the right to privacy is invaded by (a) unreasonable intrusion upon the

I Smith v. Colo. Interstate Gas Co., 777 F. Supp. 854, 856 (D. Colo. 1991).
Smith's
complaint also asserted that her firing by the defendant, which she alleged was an act of gender and
ethnic discrimination, was a violation of her civil rights. The privacy count alleged that the
defendant violated her right to privacy by contacting her new temporary employer to disclose that
she had filed a complaint for retaliatory firing, by suggesting that the temporary employer check the
accuracy of the information on her employment application, and by subsequently confirming that the
statement on Smith's application that she had been laid off by the defendant was not accurate. As a
result Smith was dismissed from her temporary position and denied a permanent position.
2 Rugg v. McCarty, 476 P.2d 753, 754 (Colo. 1970). Rugg alleged that a debt collector
invaded her privacy through numerous telephone calls, letters demanding payment, and a letter to
her employer indicating she was not fulfilling her expectations and inquiring how many
garnishments would be tolerated. The trial court dismissed the privacy claim, but it was unclear if
the decision was based upon non-recognition of the privacy tort, the inability of the complaint to
meet the requirements of the tort, or both. The Colorado Supreme Court reinstated the privacy claim
and remanded the case.
3/d. at 755.
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seclusion of another, (b) appropriation of the other's name or likeness,
(c) unreasonable publicity given to the other's private life, or (d)
publicity that unreasonably places the other in a false light before the
public. 4 Over Smith's unsupported assertion that the privacy tort
encompasses all affronts to one's dignity, the privacy cause of action was
dismissed because it did not fit any of those four invasions. 5
Rugg and Smith encapsulate a transition between two approaches to
tort protection of privacy. 6 Rugg reflects the unitary-tort theory, which
recognizes a single tort and seeks only to determine if the plaintiff's
interest in privacy has been breached by the defendant's behavior. 7
Smith reflects the multiple-tort approach that recognizes four torts,
encompassing four ways in which privacy is breached, that have in
common only an interference with a loosely defined understanding of
privacy. 8 This understanding of the privacy tort was lifted from the
Restatement (Second) of Torts (1977), which adopted a construct first
proffered by Dean William Prosser in a 1960 law review article. 9
Beyond the mechanical issue of whether one or mUltiple torts are
recognized, the fundamental question is whether either approach
facilitates the identification of a single value that is protected by the tort.
The unitary-tort approach treats privacy itself as that value, while the
multiple-tort theory, reflected in the Prosser article and the Restatement,
4

Smith, 777 F. Supp. at 857.

5

1d.

6 Classification of legal concepts has long been an exercise fraught with peril. In 1782,
Jeremy Bentham noted, "there is no neutral term which can be applied in common to the ideas
denoted by the words general and particular, so as to bring to view the one without putting an
exclusion upon the other. [This]... is a sort of verbal contradiction which however it seemed
impossible to avoid." JEREMY BENTHAM, THE LIMITS OF JURISPRUDENCE DEFINED 161 n.1 (Charles
Warren Everett ed., Greenwood Press 1970). Bentham fortunately used "particular" and "general"
rather than his preferred "atomoprosetic" and "eidoprosetic." Id. Almost two centuries later,
Professor Ruth Gavison, distinguishing between types of laws that protect rights, classified
protections as falling into the "adjustment," "piecemeal," "general remedy," or "declaration of right"
approach. See Ruth Gavison, Should We Have a "General Right to Privacy" in Israel?," 12 ISR. L.
REV. 155, 158-59 (1977). Another approach focuses on the character of the tort at issue and
distinguishes between the "Prosser Four-Part Analysis," the "Unified Tort Theory," and the
"Unneeded Tort Theory." Jacqueline Hanson Dee, The Absence of False Light From the Wisconsin
Privacy Statute, 66 MARQ. L. REv. 99, 104-08 (1982). The "unitary" and "mUltiple tort" labels used
here are adapted from the classifications used by Dee.
7
See Rugg, 476 P.2d at 753. See also Dee, supra note 6, at 105-07.
8 Smith, 777 F. Supp. at 857.
Dee refers to this approach as the "Prosser Four Tort
Analysis." Dee, supra note 6, at 105-07. In adopting this classification for use here, I refer more
generally to a multiple-tort theory to focus on the aspect of the approach that envisions multiple torts
for multiple invasions of privacy, thus holding out the possibility of additional torts for additional
invasions of privacy, as envisioned by RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (1977).
9 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (1977); see also William L. Prosser, Privacy,
48 CAL L. REV. 383, 389 (1960).
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views the single value in privacy as an illusory umbrella that embraces
four loosely linked, independent concerns. to
The multiple-tort approach has been dominant in the United States
over the last four decades, and the proponents of the unitary-tort
approach have become a minority voice. II The Restatement, however,
envisioned that the further development of the privacy tort would see
additional invasions of privacy incorporated into Prosser's four-tort
structure. 12 This has not occurred, and additional privacy torts have
generally been created by statute to respond to specific threats. 13 In the
absence of the flexibility envisioned by the Restatement, the debate over
the privacy tort has generally been oriented around the two approaches
manifested in Rugg and Smith. Adherents of the unitary-tort theory view
the four-tort approach as a corruption of what the privacy tort was
intended to be. 14 Those supporting the multiple-tort theory, however,
believe that the four-tort approach clarifies the conceptual confusion
created by the privacy tort's unitary theory origins. 15 Its ascendance
notwithstanding, the Restatement's four -tort structure, has stunted the
development of both approaches' ability to evolve and adapt to emerging
threats. 16
This Comment argues that the flexibility envisioned by the
Restatement can best be achieved through an alternative offered by the
Government of Ireland in the summer of 2006. 17 The Irish proposal
recognizes a single tort for invasion of privacy, defining the degree of
privacy that an individual may expect as that which is reasonable under
all the circumstances. 18 It lists a series of factors to consider when
evaluating all the circumstances, as well as defenses and recognized
violations. 19 The Irish integrative approach seeks to incorporate the
elasticity of the unitary-tort approach with the clarity of the multiple-tort
approach in a single statute. Adoption of the Irish approach would allow
American jurisdictions to more clearly articulate the privacy tort and to
10 See infra notes 29-60 and accompanying text. Unless otherwise indicated, references to
the "Restatement" referto the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § (1977).
II See infra notes 61-80 and accompanying text.
12 See infra notes 124-126 and accompanying text.
13 See infra notes 127-136 and accompanying text.
14 See infra notes 29-48 and accompanying text.
15 See infra notes 49-60 and accompanying text.
16 See infra notes 81-124 and accompanying text.
17 See GOy'T OF IRELAND, REPORT OF WORKING GROUP ON PRIVACY (2006) (available from
of
Justice,
Equality
and
Law
Refonn
website)
at
Department
http://www.justice.ie/en/JELR/WkgGrpPri vacy. pdf/Files/WkgGrpPrivacy. pdf.
18
[d. 'II 7.13-14, app. § 3(1).
19
[d. 'II 7.13, app. § 3(2); 'II 7.22, app. § 6( I )(a-d); 'II 7.17, app. § 4( I )(a-d).
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better channel the adaptive powers of American common law. 2o Part I of
this Comment explains that modern American privacy-tort law is the
result of the tension between two conflicting viewpoints on invasion-ofprivacy torts. 21 Part II shows how the widespread acceptance of the fourtort structure in the United States has stunted the development of the
privacy tort. 22 Part III surveys the provisions of the Irish proposal, while
Part IV analyzes the benefits offered by the Irish integrative approach. 23
Part V explores how an American jurisdiction can utilize a structure like
that in the Irish bill to take advantage of these benefits. 24 Finally, Part VI
concludes that the Irish proposal offers an opportunity for American
privacy-tort jurisprudence to embrace the adaptive and evolutionary
power of the common law. 25
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE MODERN AMERICAN PRN ACY TORT

The American privacy tort has changed significantly from its
origins as a broadly drawn protection and has been transmuted into a
compartmentalized four-tort structure that prevails today.26 This has had
the practical effect, as seen in Smith, of limiting privacy-tort protections
to acts that fall within the parameters established by the four torts, and
excluding those that fall outside that structure. 27 The ascendance of the
four-tort framework has fundamentally reordered both the form and the
scope of the invasion-of-privacy torts, to the point that subsequent
deviations from it have been tentative and isolated. 28
A. THE WARREN-BRANDEIS FRAMEWORK

Perhaps the most famous law review article in history, The Right to
Privacy by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis, proposed the idea that
privacy is the right to be left alone. 29 It asserted that recognition of the
right and a corresponding tort was required to ensure the individual's
20 See

infra notes 125-170 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 26-80 and accompanying text.
22 See infra notes 81-124 and accompanying text.
23 See infra notes 125-170 and 171-207 and accompanying text.
24 See infra notes 208-250 and accompanying text.
25 See infra notes 251-255 and accompanying text.
26 See infra notes 29-60 and accompanying text.
27 See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text.
28 See infra notes 49-56, 61-80 and accompanying text.
29 Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv. 193, 195 (1890);
see also Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591, 635 (1834), ("defendant asks to be left alone ... "); THOMAS
L. COOLEY, COOLEY ON TORTS 29 (1888) (coining phrase "right to be left alone").
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"full protection in person and property.,,30 The common law, therefore,
had to "meet the new demands of society" stemming from "instantaneous
photographs and newspaper enterprises" that invaded "the sacred
precincts of private and domestic life" and from "numerous mechanical
devices" that threatened to make the private pUblic. 31 The authors
asserted that modern enterprise had, through invasion of the individual's
privacy, "subjected him to mental pain and distress far greater than could
be inflicted by mere bodily injury.'.32 Warren and Brandeis extended
existing protections 33 in the common law to create a "general right to the
immunity of the person" that bore a "superficial resemblance" to an
action for defamation, but unlike with defamation, the invasion was a
legal injury in itself. 34 This new right was intended to protect an
individual's "inviolate personality. ,,35
Warren and Brandeis's understanding of "inviolate personality" was
not clarified further,36 but since 1890 legions of scholars have attempted
to bring greater clarity to the concept of privacy. Some have approached
this as a definitional challenge and determined that privacy is the right to
control information about oneself,37 a form of anti-totalitarianism,38 or a
right to exclusion. 39 Others have viewed privacy as the embodiment of a
value such as personhood4o or autonomy.41 Another approach has
30

[d. at 193.

[d. at 193-195.
32 [d. at 196.
31

33 These included, e.g., extension of the property rights in manuscripts and works of art to
embrace "the peace of mind or the relief afforded by the ability to prevent any publication at all" and
the logic behind injunctions against publication on the basis of breach of contract and breach of trust
to circumstances where there was no contract or relationship as akin to the implication of a term or
relationship required to prevent "an intolerable abuse." Warren & Brandeis, supra note 29, at 199203,210.
34 [d. at 207,197,213.
35 [d. at 205.

36 Brandeis appeared to attempt to offer some clarification on this matter in his famous
dissent in Olmstead v. United States: "The makers of our Constitution .... [r]ecognized the
significance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. They knew that only part
of the pain, pleasure, and satisfactions of life are to be found in material things. They sought to
protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations." Olmstead v.
United States, 277 U.S. 438, at 478-79 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
37 ARTHUR R. MILLER, ASSAULT ON PRIVACY 25 (1971); ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND
FREEDOM 7 (1967); Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE. L.J. 475, 477·78 (1968).
38 Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737,784 (1989).
39 Russell Brown, Rethinking Privacy: Exclusivity, Private Relation and Tort Law, 43
ALBERTA L. REV. 589,591 (2006).
40Daniei R. Ortiz, Privacy, Autonomy, and Consent, 12 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'y 91, 92
(1989); Tom Gerety, Redefining Privacy, 12 HARV. c.R.-C.L. L. REv. 233, 236 (1977); Jeffrey
Reiman, Privacy, Intimacy and Personhood, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 26, 33 (1976); Edward Bloustein,
Privacy, Tort Law, and the Constitution: Is Warren and Brandeis' Tort Petty and Unconstitutional
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reduced privacy to a few essential components such as "secrecy,
anonymity, and solitude,,42 or "repose, sanctuary, and intimate
decision.,,43 In the tort context, defining privacy is a narrower aspect of
this inquiry, concerned with determining what must be breached to give
rise to a civil wrong for which the law offers a remedy.44
By 1939, the notion that the right to privacy could be protected by a
single integrative form of action had received significant acceptance. 45
That year, the First Restatement of Torts recognized that "[a] person who
unreasonably and seriously interferes with another's interest in not
having his affairs known to others or his likeness exhibited to the public
is liable to the other.,,46 A hallmark early case, Pavesich v. New England
Life Insurance CO.,47 stated that "the right to withdraw from the public
gaze at such times as a person sees fit . . . is also embraced within the
right of personalliberty.,,48 This embrace of privacy as a single, unitary
concept was indicative of Warren and Brandeis's success in integrating
the strands of the cases they analyzed into a new, unified legal tort
protection.
B. PROSSER AND THE RESHAPING OF PRN ACY

This new tort protection was significantly reshaped by another wellknown law review article. The Restatement (Second) of Torts, in
recognizing the familiar four-tort structure, accepted a construct first
posited in Dean William Prosser's 1960 article entitled simply Privacy.49
as Well?, 46 TEX. L. REV. 611, 619 (1968).
41 Louis Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1410, 1425 (1974); Joel
Feinberg, Autonomy, Sovereignty and Privacy: Moral Ideas in the Constitution?, 58 NOTRE DAME
L. REv. 445,467-77 (1983).
42 Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of the Law, 89 YALE L.1. 421, 433 (1980).
43 Gary L. Bostwick, A Taxonomy of Privacy: Repose, Sanctuary, and Intimate Decision, 64
CAL. L. REv. 1447,1451 (1976).
44 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1496 (7th ed. 1999) (defining a tort as "a civil wrong for
which a remedy may be obtained, usu. in the form of damages").
45 As early as 1902, when the New York Court of Appeals held in Roberson v. Rochester
Folding Box Co., 64 N.E. 442, 447 (N.Y. 1902), that there was no common-law right to privacy, the
public outcry was so strong that one of the majority judges felt compelled to defend the opinion in a
law review article. See Dennis O'Brien, The Right of Privacy, 2 COLUM. L. REv. 437, 437-38
(1902). For a history of privacy from 1890 to 1990, see Ken Gormley, 100 Years of Privacy, 1992
WIS. L. REV. 1335 (1992).
46 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 867 (1939).
47 Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, 70 (Ga. 1905) (recognizing a breach of
an artist's right to privacy when an insurance company published his picture next to that of an
obviously sick man in an endorsement).
48

49

1d.
Prosser, supra note 9, at 383; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (1977).
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Prosser sought to "inquire what interest we are protecting, and against
what conduct," and his conclusions were based upon "something over
three hundred cases in the books.,,5o He argued that what had emerged
was not one tort, but a complex of four, protecting against "four distinct
kinds of invasions of four different interests of the plaintiff, which are
tied together by the common name, but otherwise have almost nothing in
common except that each represents an interference with the right of the
plaintiff. .. 'to be let alone. ",51 Prosser viewed the confusion about
Warren and Brandeis's invocation of inviolate personality as requiring
the separating and distinguishing of the four torts that he identified. 52
With the Restatement's incorporation of the Prosser view, the
ascendance of the torts of intrusion, 53 false-light publicity,54 disclosure
of private facts, 55 and appropriation,56 and the required elements for each,
became institutionalized into the American legal landscape.
The impact of Prosser's framework is both wide and deep. Almost
everyone of America's fifty-four jurisdictions has accepted at least one
of the four torts. 57 Prosser's formulation has been the starting point for

50

Prosser, supra note 9, at 388-89.

51

[d.

52 [d.

at 407.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 6528 (1977) ("One who intentionally intrudes,
physically or otherwise, upon the solitude of another or his private affairs or concerns, is subject to
liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a
reasonable person.").
54 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E (1977) ("One who gives publicity to a matter
concerning another that places the other before the public in a false light is subject to liability to the
other for invasion of his privacy, if (a) the false light in which the other was placed would be highly
offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) the actor had knowledge of or acted in reckless disregard as
to the falsity of the publicized matter and the false light in which the other would be placed.").
55 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977)("One who gives publicity to a matter
concerning the private life of another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if
the matter publicized is of a kind that (a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) is
not oflegitimate concern to the pu blic.").
56 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C (1977) ("One who appropriates to his own use
or benefit the name or likeness of another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his
privacy.").
57 The fifty-four jurisdictions are the fifty states, the District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto
Rico, and the United States Virgin Islands. Only North Dakota has declined to recognize any of the
four torts. South Dakota, Guam, and Puerto Rico have neither recognized nor declined to recognize
any of the four. Wyoming has declined to recognize the misappropriation tort and has neither
recognized nor declined to adopt the other three. All four torts have been recognized in twenty-nine
jurisdictions, with fourteen accepting three of the torts, two accepting two of the torts, and three
The intrusion-against-seclusion tort has been recognized by forty-six
accepting one of them.
jurisdictions, the misappropriation tort by forty-five, the private-facts tort by forty-two, and the falselight tort by thirty-two. MEDIA LAW RESOURCE CENTER, MEDIA PRIVACY AND RELATED LAW
2006-07 1647-55 (2006).
53
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the consideration of privacy-tort law in decades' worth of judicial
decisions. 58 The Supreme Court of Connecticut, for example, recognized
the four torts while summarily adopting the Prosser statement that the
privacy tort did not develop as a single tort, but a complex of four. 59
This pattern, taken to its logical conclusion, has resulted in courts
deciding privacy cases on whether the facts fit one of the recognized
torts, not on whether the interest breached is one for which society seeks
to provide a remedy.60
C. MODERN DEVIATION FROM THE MULTIPLE-TORT THEORY
The ascendance of the multiple-tort approach appears also to have
constrained the employment of other mechanisms to create forms that
deviate from it. Both the recognition of a right to privacy in a state
constitution and the enactment of a state privacy statute offer the
opportunity for a legislature to deviate from the multiple-tort approach.
Only one state, however, has employed those mechanisms to move
beyond the four-tort approach. 61
Ten states have incorporated declarations of a right to privacy into
their state constitutions. 62 In all but one, though, this declaration has no
impact on tort law. 63 Only in California does the constitutional

58 See, e.g., Denver Pub. Co. v. Bueno, 54 P.3d 893, 896 (Colo. 2002) (declining to recognize
the false-light-publicity tort because it overlaps with defamation); Hougum v. VaHey Mem'l
Hospital, 574 N.W.2d 812, 816 (N.D. 1998) (declining to recognize any of the four torts);
Pontbriand v. Sundlun, 699 A.2d 856, 862 n.12 (R.I. 1997) (noting that Rhode Island recognizes
only a statutory right to privacy); Lake v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 582 N.W.2d 231, 234-36 (Minn.
1988) (recognizing all but the false-light tort); Renwick v. News & Observer Publ'g Co., 312 S.E.2d
405, 410 (N.C. 1984) (declining to recognize the false-light-publicity tort). But see Anderson v.
Fisher Broad. Co., 712 P.2d 803, 808 (Or. 1986) ("The exact formulations of the Restatement are not
necessarily authoritative statements of the law of this state ....").
59 Goodrich v. Waterbury Republican-American, Inc., 448 A.2d 1317, 1329 (Conn. 1982)
(quoting Prosser, supra note 9, at 383).
60 See Smith v. Colo. Interstate Gas Co., 777 F. Supp. 854,857 (D. Colo. 1991); Dwyer v.
American Express Corp., 652 N.E.2d 1351, 1356 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (dismissing a misappropriation
claim against a credit card company for selling lists of consumers classified into demographic groups
because the information lacked intrinsic value). See also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1496 (7th ed.
1999) (defining a tort as "a civil wrong for which a remedy may be obtained, usu. [sic] in the form of
damages").
61 See infra notes 64-75 and accompanying text.
62 Four explicitly declare a right to privacy: Ala. Const. art. I, § 22; Cal. Const. art. I , § I;
Haw. Const. art. I, § 6; Mont. Const. art. II, § 10. Three provide that the individual shall be secure
against invasions of privacy: Ill. Const. art. I, § 6; La. Const. art. I, § 5; S. C. Const. art. I, § 10.
Two declare that no person shall be disturbed in his private affairs: Ariz. Const. art. II, § 8; Wash.
Const. art. I, § 7; Florida's Constitution provides that "every natural person has the right to be let
alone and free from governmental intrusion into the person's private life." Fla. Const. art. I, § 23.
63 See, e.g., Resha v. Tucker, 670 So. 2d 56, 57 (Fla. 1996); Cape Pub., Inc. v. Hitchner, 549
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recognition of a right to privacy support a corresponding tort cause of
action. 64 A declaration of a right to privacy was incorporated into the
California Constitution through a voter initiative in 1972.65 In 1975, the
California Supreme Court ruled that the constitutional provision provided
a cause of action in tort available to all Californians. 66 The court's
decision was based upon the text of a brochure from supporters of the
initiative stating that the provision would create a legally enforceable
right to privacy. 67
Just as state constitutional protections have done little to upset the
ascendance of the four-tort approach, state privacy statutes creating tort
causes of action have shown little deviation from the Restatement
architecture. Nineteen states have enacted tort protections against
invasions of privacy. 68 In ten of these states the statutes protect only
property-like interests in name or likeness through authorizing tort
recovery for misappropriation or breach of the right to pUblicity.69 Five
so. 2d 1374, 1377 (Ra. 1989); Forsberg v. Housing Auth., 455 So. 2d 373, 374 (Ra. 1984)
(Overton, J., concurring); see also Reid v. Pierce County, 961 P.2d 333, 342-43 (Wash. 1998)
(declining to recognize a civil cause of action based upon the constitutional protection).
64 See Cal. Const. art. I, § I ("All people are by nature free and independent and have
inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing,
and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy.").
65 White v. Davis, 533 P.2d 222, 233-34 (Cal. 1975).
66 [d. at 775.
67 The brochure stated, "At present there are no effective restraints on the information
activities of government and business. This amendment creates a legal and enforceable right of
privacy for every Californian." [d. at 774. California courts had long used such material to clarify
the intent behind measures adopted by initiative. See, e.g., Carter v. Comm'n on Qualifications of
Judicial Appointments, 93 P.2d 140, 144 (Cal. 1939); Beneficial Loan Soc'y Ltd. v. Haight, II P.2d
857,860 (Cal. 1932); Story v. Richardson, 198 P. 1057, 1059 (Cal. 1921).
68 California, Rorida, II1inois, Indiana, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Nebraska, Nevada, New
York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington,
Wisconsin.
69 Rorida, Ra. Stat. Ann. §§ 540.08 (West, Westlaw through 2007 Special 'A' Sess.);
II1inois, 765 III. Compo Stat. Ann. § 1075 (West, Westlaw through 2006 Sess.); Indiana, Ind. Code
Ann. §§ 32-13-1-1 to 32-13-1-20 (West, Westlaw through 2006 Sess.); Kentucky, I Ky. Rev. Stat.
Ann. §§ 391.170 (West, Westlaw through 2006 Reg. Sess. and First Extraordinary Sess.); Nevada,
Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 597.770 to 597.810 (West, Westlaw through 2005 Sess.); New York, N.Y.
Civ. Rights Law §§ 50-51 (McKinney, Westlaw through L.2007, ch. 2); Ohio, Ohio Rev. Code Ann.
§§ 2741.01 to 2741.09 (West, Westlaw through 2006 Sess.); Oklahoma, Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, §§
839.1 to 839.4, 1448-1449 (West, Westlaw through 2006 Second Extraordinary Sess.);
Pennsylvania, 46 Pa. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 8316 (West, Westlaw through 2006 Act 151); Tennessee,
TENN. CODE. ANN. §§ 47-25-1101 to 47-25-1108 (West, Westlaw through 2006 Second Reg. Sess.);
Texas, TEX. PROP. CODE §§ 26.001 to 26.015 (Vernon, Westlaw through 2006 3rd Called Sess.);
Utah, UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 45-3-1 to 45-3-6 (West, Westlaw through 2006 legislation); Virginia,
VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-40 (West, Westlaw through 2006 Special Sess. I); Washington, WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. §§ 63.60.010 to 63.60.080 (West, Westlaw through 2007 Reg. Sess. Ch. 2). The
misappropriation tort is one of the four torts identified by Prosser and recognized in the Restatement.
See supra notes 68-73 and accompanying text. The right of publicity was created in an effort to
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states' statutes move beyond misappropriation and publicity, with all
four Prosser torts codified in the Nebraska and Rhode Island statutes,
while the Wisconsin statute codifies three and the California statute
codifies two. 70
Massachusetts, the fifth state to move beyond misappropriation and
publicity, is different. In addition to codifying a misappropriation
protection, the commonwealth has a statutory tort protection of privacy
apparently untouched by Prosser and the Restatement. 71 It provides, "A
person shall have a right against unreasonable, substantial, or serious
interference with his privacy."n While the Massachusetts courts have
also recognized the general substance of the private-facts and intrusion
torts, but not the false-light tort, they have done so without extending
explicit recognition of a common-law privacy protection. 73 Instead, they

distinguish one's ability to exclusively control the commercial use of name, likeness, or other
distinct characteristic from the misappropriation tort. Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum,
Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953). The breach of the right of publicity tort is generally
applicable only to plaintiffs who have achieved some fame or notoriety. See White v. Samsung
Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th Cir. 1992); Matthews v. Wozencraft, 15 F.3d 432, 437-38
(5th Cir. 1994); Ali v. Playgirl, 447 F. Supp. 723, 725 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). Despite its origins in an
effort to distinguish it from the privacy torts, it is frequently treated as an aspect of privacy, owing to
its close relationship to the misappropriation tort. See VIcrOR E. SCHWARTZ, KATHRYN KELLY,
DAVID F. PARTLETI, PROSSER, WADE AND SCHWARTZ'S TORTS, liTH. ED. XVIII, 939-984 (2005);
JOHN L. DIAMOND, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS IX, 724-749 (200 I).
70 NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 20-201 to 20-211, 25-840.01 (West, Westlaw through 2006 Second
Reg. Sess.). R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 9-1-28 to 9-1-28.1 (West, Westlaw through 2006 legislation).
Wisconsin foregoes the false light tort. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 995.50 (West, Westlaw current through
2005 Act 491). California codifies an intrusion, misappropriation, and publicity tort. CAL CIY.
CODE §§ 1708.8,3344,3344.1 (West, Westlaw through 2006 legislation).
71 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 214, § 3A (West, Westlaw current through Ch. 417 of 2006 2nd
Annual Sess.) (codifying the misappropriation cause of action).
72 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 214, § IB (West, Westlaw current through Ch. 417 of 2006 2nd
Annual Sess.).
73 For recognition of the private-facts tort, see Bratt v. IBM, 467 N.E.2d 126, 134 (Mass.
1984) (interpreting § 1B as prohibiting "disclosure of facts ... of a highly personal or intimate nature
when there is no countervailing interest."); Haggerty v. Globe Newspaper, 419 N.E. 2d 844, 845
(Mass. 1981) (holding that allegation of publication of decade-old investigative materials "just
barely succeeds" in stating claim). For recognition of the intrusion tort, see Schlesinger v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 567 N.E.2d 912, 916 (Mass. 1991) (addressing intrusion theory
for the first time under § IB and holding that infrequent telephone solicitations are not a privacy
violation); Cort v. Bristol Myers Co., 431 N.E.2d 908. 913-14 (Mass. 1982) (recognizing the
intrusion tort and holding that an employer's questionnaire did not violate employee's right to
privacy). The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts declined to recognize the false-light tort in
Ayash v. Dana-Farber Cancer Inst., 822 N.E.2d 667, 682 n.16 (Mass. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct.
397 (2005), and Elm Med. Lab., Inc. v. RKO Gen., Inc., 532 N.E.2d 675, 681 (Mass. 1989) ("The
only invasion ... the plaintiffs assert is ... 'false light.' This court has not recognized that tort and
does not choose to do so now."). While the Supreme Judicial Court has devoted significant effort to
defining the contours of the statutory protection, it has declined to address whether there are
corresponding non-statutory protections. See Tower v. Hirschhorn, 492 N.E.2d 728, 732 (Mass.
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have grounded their judgments in the two statutes, which thus provide a
right of recovery independent of the four-tort construct. 74
The
Massachusetts statutes, coupled with this decisional law,75 have had the
practical effect of melding the Prosser torts of private facts, intrusion,
and misappropriation with a unitary-tort theory cause of action.
The deviations in California and Massachusetts are isolated, and
there is little, if any, indication that these approaches might be duplicated
elsewhere. They do suggest that assessment of the privacy tort is a more
dynamic consideration than the Restatement suggests, but not by much.
Privacy torts have come to be viewed through intellectual shorthand in
which "Warren and Brandeis" equal the right to be left alone, "Prosser"
equals four torts, and California and Massachusetts do not bear
mentioning. 76 This shorthand suggests a strictly linear view in which
Prosser's work is a refinement of Warren and Brandeis's.77 Another

1986) ("We have declined to determine whether there is a comparable non-statutory claim in tort for
invasion of privacy.").
74 See Schlesinger, 567 N.E.2d at 916; Cort, 431 N.E.2d at 438 n.9.
75
See supra note 73.
76 See JOHN L. DIAMOND, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS IX, 724-749 (2001). VICTOR E.
SCHWARTZ, KATHRYN KELLY, DAVID F. PARTLETT, PROSSER, WADE AND SCHWARTZ'S TORTS, 11 m
ED. XVIII, 939-84 (2005). In both texts, the chapters dealing with privacy torts initially introduce
the Warren and Brandeis concept and then are organized according to the Prosser taxonomy. The
California and Massachusetts approaches are not mentioned.
77 A strictly linear approach that assumes that what follows is a refinement and improvement
of what preceded fails to allow for any pragmatism in the development of the law. In 1887, Harvard
Law School Dean Christopher Columbus Langdell stated that "law is a science, and that all the
available materials of that science are contained in printed books." C.C. Langdell, Address at the
"Quarter-Millennial" Celebration of Harvard University (Nov. 5, 1887),3 LAW Q. REv. 118, 124
(1887). Included in this analogy of the law to science was an understanding that the point of science
was to uncover truth, which was immutable. Such an approach, thus, sees the law as the product of
neatly interlocking logical propositions. Grant Gilmore, The Age of Antiquarius: Our Legal History
in a Time of Trouble, 39 U. CHI. L. REV. 475, 479 (1972). Oliver Wendell Holmes's maxim that
"The life of the law has not been logic, it has been experience" is largely perceived as a broadside
against Langdell's viewpoint. O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 5 (M. Howe ed. 1963); see, e.g.,
Gilmore at 480; Buckner F. Melton, Jr., Clio at the Bar: A Guide to Historical Method for Legists
and Jurists, 83 MINN. L. REV. 377, 378-79 (1998). Decades after Holmes, Professor Grant Gilmore
would view Langdell's approach as reflective of a "historicist" viewpoint that professes that the past
can be arranged in a meaningful sequence that will not only explain the present but predict the
future. Gilmore at 480. Gilmore responds to the historicists: "Let us all become historians; let us not
become historicists." [d. at 484. Holmes, as Professor Gilmore explains, insisted that rules of law
reflect social conditions and must change as those conditions change. [d. at 480. A strictly linear
approach forgoes such a possibility because it assumes that what has been supplanted must be
discarded, while the life of the law in experience includes the possibility that what has been
supplanted may be what is again necessary to meet the prevailing social conditions. As Thomas S.
Kuhn has noted, in reference to science, but in terms equally applicable to any field in which
theories are developed and tested, "the textbook tendency to make the development of science linear
hides a process that lies at the heart of the most significant episodes of scientific development."
THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 140 (2nd ed. enlarged, 1970).
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approach, though, views the modern arrangement as the result of the
ongoing tension between the unitary- and multiple-tort theories. 78 The
implication of this second perspective is that an ascendant form is subject
to challenge by the non-dominant form. 79 This, in turn, raises the
possibility of the non-dominant form becoming the dominant form, or of
an accommodation between the two. 80
II. THE STUNTED COMMON LAW TORT

Beyond the separation and clarification that Prosser envisioned, the
multiple-tort approach has also restrained the growth of privacy as a
common law tort doctrine. 81 Not surprisingly, since the ascendance of
78 The now familiar dynamic, explained by Dr. Kuhn, of the paradigm shift involves a
fundamental change in the basic understanding of how a given field operates. See Kuhn, supra note
77 at 77-173. Kuhn, embodying his traditional science perspective, described a paradigm as "some
accepted examples of actual scientific practice-examples which include law, theory, application,
and instrumentation together-provide models from which spring particular coherent traditions of
scientific research." Id. at 10. A paradigm shift occurs when a new theory explains inconsistencies
between the old theory and observed conditions. Id. at 111-159. Such a shift occurs when a new
theory is selected as the fittest way to practice in a field in the future. Id. at 172. While the
development of legal doctrines does not rely on observation and empiricism to the extent that
traditional science does, Kuhn's explanation of the process is no less illuminating in the legal arena
than in the scientific arena. Because legal doctrines do not develop through the same processes of
observation and testing as do scientific doctrines, the shift from the unitary- to multiple-tort
approach to privacy, which may appear to be a paradigm shift, may actually be just part of the
process oftesting competing approaches.
79 As Kuhn envisioned it, a paradigm shift in one of the traditional sciences, once it occurs,
must so profoundly resolve inconsistencies and change the nature of understanding that it is,
essentially, irrevocable. Kuhn, supra note 77 at 144-60. Outside traditional sciences, the
expectation is not quite as profound. Kuhn recognized that in the humanities there are always
competing solutions that arise. Id. at 164-65. In a field like the law, where competing solutions are
expected and are essential to the vitality of the system, the re-emergence of a previously discarded
approach need not give rise to a theoretical crisis. Even when it does, though, it can easily be
concluded, as in traditional science, that a paradigm shift has not occurred. Indeed, this Comment
implicitly suggests that a paradigm shift with respect to privacy torts cannot have occurred through
the ascendance of the multiple-tort theory, because that theory has not resolved the inconsistencies
and problems attendant to its primacy.
80 Kuhn's analysis suggests that true paradigm shifts do not occur in the law all that often.
There is a democratic aspect to the law that Kuhn's scientific theory is not equipped to deal with.
Each jurisdiction is empowered to make its own decision about how its tort laws will operate, and
the notion that a given area of the law might be the object of a majority approach, a minority
approach, and any number of other variations is unsurprising. This dynamic, seen through the prism
of Kuhn's work, suggests that each area of the law is constantly engaged in the search for a new
paradigm that only is validated when all, or at least most, jurisdictions adopt the same answers to the
same questions. That there might be cycles of ascendance among theories in a given area, and
attempts to accommodate between them, is evidence of the vitality with which these searches take
place.
81 Common law, as used here refers to the "body of law derived from judicial decisions,
rather than from statutes or constitutions." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 270 (7'" ed. 1999). It also
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the Prosser argument in the 1960s and its validation in the Restatement in
the 1970s, the common law has devoted scant attention to identifying the
central value at the core of the unitary-tort approach to privacy. 82
Somewhat surprisingly, though, the primacy of the multiple-tort theory
appears also to have constrained the development of the multiple-tort
approach to privacy envisioned by the Restatement. 83
America's common-law system, based upon judges' reliance on
previous decisions, is supposed to yield a legal system that adapts to
changes in society.84 This requires evaluating the context in which
conduct occurs and determining whether it conforms to developed
norms. 85 As Professor Arthur Hogue stated, "[t]he survival of the
[English] common law has depended in large part on the ability of its
practitioners to adapt the legal system to new conditions .... ,,86 Since
1960, this adaptability with respect to privacy has been restrained by the
prevalence of the four-tort structure. 87 The common law of privacy has
scarcely adapted to new conditions and deviations from the multiple-tort
theory embodied in the four torts have been tentative at best. 88
A. RETARDING THE UNITARy-TORT APPROACH

Not surprisingly, the ascendance of the multiple-tort approach of the
Restatement has crowded out consideration of the central value
underlying the right to privacy.89 Prosser and the Restatement view the

refers to the method by which judges create that body of law through reliance on previous decisions.
ARTHUR L. CORBIN, WHAT Is THE COMMON LAW? 75 (1954). See also Prosser, supra note 9, at
407, for Prosser's description of the purpose of his article.
82 See infra notes 89-124 and accompanying text.
83 See infra notes 104-124 and accompanying text.
84 See, e.g., Harrison v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 456 A.2d 894, 903 (Md. 1983)
("The common law is not static; its life and heart is its dynamism-its ability to keep pace with the
world while constantly searching for just and fair solutions to pressing societal problems.") (cited in
M. Stuart Madden, The Vital Common Law: Its Role in a Statutory Age, 18 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.
REV. 555, 555 (1996»; see also PATRICK DEVLIN, THE JUDGE 177 (1979) ("They looked for the
reason, which had made him decide the case the way he did, the ratio decidendi as it came to be
called. Thus it was the principle of the case, not the words, which went into the common law.").
85 Madden, supra note 84, at 561.
86 ARTHUR R. HOGUE, ORIGINS OF THE COMMON LAW 231 (1966) (quoted in Madden, supra
note 84, at 593).
87 See infra notes 89-124 and accompanying text.
88 See infra notes 61-80, 89-124 and accompanying text.
89 In South Dakota, for example, a privacy tort consistent with RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §
867 (1939) was recognized in 1963 by the state supreme court in Truxes v. Kenco Enters., Inc., 119
N.W.2d 914, 917 (S.D. 1963). In so doing, the court stated, "The common law of this state .. .is
flexible and capable of adaptation to the needs and demands of changing times." Id. at 916. In
1979, however, the court cited the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A-E (1977) four-tort
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four torts as sharing little more than an ill-defined privacy labe1. 90 The
unitary-tort approach, by contrast, is grounded in the existence of a core
privacy value. 91 The broad ascendance of the multiple-tort approach has
largely relegated consideration of that central core to the work of
academics. 92
Edward Bloustein expressed the unitary-tort position most starkly,
stating that the consequence of Prosser's view "is that Warren and
Brandeis were wrong and their analysis of the tort of privacy a
mistake.,,93 He continued, "[i]nstead of a relatively new, basic and
independent legal right protecting a unique, fundamental and relatively
neglected interest, we find a mere application in novel circumstances of
traditional legal rights designed to protect well-identified and established
social values.,,94 Bloustein, thereby, concluded that Warren and Brandeis
did indeed create a single right to privacy shielding the interest in
preserving individual dignity, and that "the tort cases involving privacy
are of one piece and involve a single tort.,,95
Bloustein conceded that Warren and Brandeis "went very little
beyond giving their right and their interest a name and distinguishing it
from other rights or interests," but argued also that Warren and Brandeis
did indicate the interest they sought to protect in their invocation of
inviolate personality.96 Bloustein took this to mean one's "independence,
dignity and integrity; it defines man's essence as a unique and self
determining being.,,97 This view focuses on the moral right of the
individual to define his or her own human existence and the
transgression of that right that occurs when another party seeks to do so
without consent. 98
The problem with the focus on individual dignity is that the concept
is so metaphysical that even proponents of the unitary-tort approach have
questioned its utility.99 Other commentators have taken the same

structure in defining what gave rise to a right to recover for invasion of privacy. Montgomery Ward
v. Shope, 286 N.W.2d 806, 809 n.2 (S.D. 1979).
90 See supra notes 49-60 and accompanying text.
91 See supra notes 29-48 and accompanying text.
92 See supra notes 36-43, infra notes 100-103, and accompanying text.
93 Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy as an Answer of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean
Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 965 (1964).
94 1d. at 965-966.
95 1d. at 986, 1000.
96 Id. at 970-71 (quoting Warren and Brandeis, supra note 29, at 205).
97 Id. at 971.
98 Sheldon W. Halpern, Rethinking the Right to Privacy: Dignity, Decency, and the Law's
Limitations, 43 RUTGERS L. REV. 539, 544-49 (1991).
99 See, e.g., Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of the Law, 89 YALE LJ. 421, 438 (1980)
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approach as Bloustein and found different core principles. Some have
found that the unifying principle is the autonomy to engage in one's own
thoughts and to make one's own decisions. 100 Another perspective is that
privacy is the right to decide when, how, and what information about
them is communicated to others. 101 Still another expresses Warren and
Brandeis's original concept as the right to be left alone, with respect to
the acquisition and dissemination of information concerning the person,
particularly through unauthorized publication, photography, or media.102
Within this diversity, there is accord on the conclusion that a common
thread exists. 103 The ascendance of the four torts has, however, largely
relegated this discussion to the halls of law schools and the pages of law
journals.
B. RETARDING THE MULTIPLE-TORT APPROACH

Prosser's four-tort structure was the result of his effort to "separate
and distinguish" the common law of privacy up to 1960. Hl4 The
Restatement contemplated development of its privacy-tort structure
beyond that offered by Prosser, by recognizing that further court
decisions and other references might recognize expansion of the four
forms or establishment of new forms. 105 This view is consistent with the
general concept of the common law discussed above. 106
Adaptation has occurred to a certain extent through piecemeal
creation of causes to cover additional invasions of privacy. 107 Congress
has adopted a number of statutes prohibiting certain breaches of privacy
and authorizing civil actions against alleged perpetrators, thus creating a
number of mini-torts. These have included actions against those who

("[Tlhere are ways to offend dignity and personality that have nothing to do with privacy.");
Halpern, supra note 98, at 563 ("The law is probably not the appropriate vehicle for the furtherance
of the 'inviolate personality."').
100 See Joel Feinberg, Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Privacy, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 445,
467-77 (1983); Louis Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1410,1425 (1974); Daniel
R. Ortiz, Privacy, Autonomy, and Consent, 12 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'y 91, 92 (1989).
101 See Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 477 (1978); Hyman Gross, The Concept of
Privacy, 42 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 34, 35 (1967).
102 Gormley, supra note 45, at 1357.
103 See supra notes 99-102 and accompanying text.
104 Prosser, supra note 9, at 407.
105 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A note c (1977) ("further court decisions and
other references may give rise to the expansion of the four forms of tort liability for invasion of
privacy listed in this Section or the establishment of new forms. Nothing in this chapter is intended
to exclude the possibility of future developments in the law of privacy.").
106 See supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
107 Ruth Gavison, supra note 6, at 158.
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communications,l09 and willfully violate Fair Credit Reporting Act
privacy protections. ~IO This dynamic:: has been repeated in most states.
California, for instance, authorizes civil actions by consumers suffering
damages arising from unauthorized disclosure or use of credit
information by credit reporting and investigative agencies, III
unauthorized disclosure or use of personal medical information, 112
disclosure of consumer information arising from a business's failure to
destroy business records,113 and prohibited debt collection practices such
as disclosure of the debt to a debtor's employer."4 Other states have
authorized civil actions and damages for a range of privacy intrusions. 115
Inherent in these protections is a judgment that a need for protection is
not met by the existing torts. That they were adopted by statute and did
not arise from the common law suggests that courts were either unwilling
or unable to fashion protections against these privacy infringements.
Rather than adapting to new threats to privacy, the common-law
consideration of privacy torts has been confined to concerns that fall
within the four-tort structure. In Joe Dickerson & Associates, LLC v.
Dittmar, for instance, the Colorado Supreme Court formally recognized
the appropriation-of-name-or-likeness tort and invalidated a jury
instruction requiring that a plaintiff prove his or her name or likeness had
value in order to recover personal damages. 116 With respect to the
public-disclosure-of-private-facts tort, there has been considerable case
law on the conditions under which an individual becomes a public figure

18 U.S.C.A. § 2520(a) (Westlaw 2007).
18 U.S.C.A. § 2708 (Westlaw 2007).
110 15 U.S.C.A. § 1681(n) (Westlaw 2007).
III CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1785.31,1786.50 (West, Westlaw through 2006 legislation); see also
Consumer Credit Reporting Agencies Act, CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1785-1785.36 (West, Westlaw
through 2006 legislation); Investigative Consumer Reporting Agencies Act, CAL. ClY. CODE §§
1786-1786.60 (West, Westlaw through 2006 legislation).
112 CAL. ClY. CODE §§ 56.35-36 (West, Westlaw through 2006 legislation); see also CAL. CIV.
CODE §§ 56-56.37 (West, Westlaw through 2006 legislation).
113 CAL. ClY. CODE § 1798.84 (b)-(e) (West, Westlaw through 2006 legislation); see also CAL.
CIv. CODE §§ 1798.80-84 (West, Westlaw through 2006 legislation).
114 CAL. ClY. CODE §§ 1788.30-33 (West, Westlaw through 2006 legislation); see also CAL.
CIV.CODE§ 1788.12.
115 See, e.g., Indiana P.L.ll5-2005 Vol. 3, § I (authorizing civil action and damages up to
$\OO,OOO.for unauthorized installation of spyware); Delaware Session Laws Vol. 75: 61, § I 2005
(authorizing civil action and treble damages for failure to provide notification of unauthorized
acquisition of personal information).
116 Joe Dickerson & Assocs., LLC v. Dittmar, 34 P.3d 995, 999 (Colo. 2001); see also CJICiv. 4th 28:4 (2000).
108

109
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to whom the tort is unavailable. 117 Further energy has been devoted to
what is required to fulfill the publication requirement for the publicity
and false-light torts. I IS Additionally, regarding the public-disclosure tort,
there has been considerable litigation on the impact of the First
Amendment. 119 The well-known case of Time, Inc. v. Hill laid down the
Constitutional requirement that a false-light plaintiff prove that the
defendant knew the statements published were false or acted with
reckless disregard as to falsity. 120 While the Constitutional cases
necessarily impact the scope of the protection, they are reflective of
concerns raised by the Constitution, not by the ongoing development of
the common law.
Similarly, the development of privacy-tort law has been devoid of
doctrinal adjustments that would allow courts to respond to new
conditions. The development of comparative fault, the abandonment of
the rule against spouses suing one another, the establishment of a

117 See Cohen v. Marx, 211 P.2d 320, 331 (Cal. Ct. App. 1949) (prize fighter was public
figure); Koussevitzky v. Allen, Towne & Heath, Inc., 68 N.Y.S.2d 779, 782 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1947),
affd, 69 N.Y.S.2d 432 (N.Y. App. Div. 1947) (symphony conductor was public figure); Martin v.
Dorton, 50 So.2d 391,396 (Miss. 1951) (sheriff was public figure). In a similar line of cases,
otherwise private figures were held to have been drawn into public events and to have become public
figures in relation to those events. See Jones v. Herald Post Co., 18 S.W.2d 972, 977 (Ky. 1929)
(plaintiffs husband murdered in front of her); Berg v. Minnesota Star & Tribune Co., 79 F. Supp.
957,962 (D. Minn. 1948) (plaintiff was in midst of divorce litigation); Stryker v. Republic Pictures
Corp. 238 P.2d 670, 672 (Cal. Ct. App. 1951) (war hero); Elmhurst v. Pearson, 153 F.2d 467, 470
(D.C. Cir.1946) (defendant in sedition trial).
118 See Grigorenko v. Pauls, 297 F. Supp. 2d 446, 448-49 (D. Conn. 2003) (disclosure of
plagiarism allegation to nine persons at university and three persons outside university insufficient
for false-light claim); Bodah v. Lakeville Motor Express, Inc., 663 N.W.2d 550, 554 (Minn. 2003)
(holding that dissemination of names and social security numbers of 204 employees to sixteen
freight-terminal manages in six states did not constitute publicity necessary to support a publicationof-private-facts claim); Mayer v. Huesner, 107 P.3d 152, 156 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005) (circulation of
medical report within company insufficient publicity to support private-facts claim); Myers v. Levy,
805 N .E.2d 442, 446-47 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (affirming that a statement by a union official to a
trade-show official that a business owner was picketing the union's booth was not sufficient
publicity to support the business owner's false-light-publicity claim against the union official); Dietz
v. Finlay Fine Jewelry Corp., 754 N.E.2d. 958, 967 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (holding release of former
employee's credit information by store security manager to two employees did not fulfill publicity
requirement for private-facts action).
119 See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 520 (2001) (holding that public disclosure of
telephone conversations about public issues was protected by First Amendment, even though those
conversations had been illegally intercepted by third parties); Florida Star v. BJ.F., 491 U.S. 524,
541 (1989) ("[w]here a newspaper publishes truthful information which it has lawfully obtained,
punishment may lawfully be imposed, if at aU, only when narrowly tailored to a state interest of the
highest order ...... ); Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 496 (1975) ("Once true information is
disclosed in public court documents open to public inspection, the press cannot be sanctioned for
publishing it.").
120 385 U.S. 374, 380 (1967).
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therapist's duty to "protect third parties from a threat of serious harm
posed by a patient under his care," the creation of the "negligent
infliction of emotional distress" tort, and the allocation of the spousal
testimonial privilege to the spouse-witness all are common-law
adjustments, the dynamism of which has not been duplicated by the
privacy torts. 121 One might anticipate, for example, that a court might
adjust the publication requirement to allow recovery when even limited
dissemination, as with personal information, has caused or could cause
significant damage. This has not occurred.
Measured by the standards inherent in its creation, the multiple-tort
approach has failed to meet its adaptive aspirations. 122 Its central
shortcoming is not simply the inability to generate a fifth privacy tort; it
is that the four-tort structure has imposed an elemental approach to
privacy torts in which the central consideration is whether the required
elements of a specific tort are met, rather than whether the interest to be
protected has been breached. 123
When these elements preclude
consideration of the central value to be protected, as Hieu Smith
discovered, the efficacy of the common-law doctrine, and its ability to
adapt and evolve, becomes questionable. 124

III. THE lNTEGRATNE APPROACH OF THE IRISH PRN ACY BILL
The Irish privacy bill, constructed by a Working Group on Privacy,
essentially seeks to integrate the unitary- and multiple-tort approaches
into one statute. 125 It is built on a structure first utilized by the Privacy
Acts of the Canadian provinces of British Columbia, Manitoba,
Newfoundland and Labrador, and Saskatchewan, which recognizes a
general right to a degree of privacy that is reasonable under the
circumstances. 126 The Irish proposal joins this understanding to factors .
to consider in determining whether a breach has occurred, as well as
recognition of specific types of intrusions, and a list of defenses to create
a tort intended to be both clear and more flexible. 127 Not only does the

See Madden, supra note 84, at 593-604.
See supra notes 105-121 and accompanying text.
123 The elemental approach is exemplified by the formulations of the privacy torts laid out in
the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B-E (1977). See supra notes 53-56.
124 See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text.
125 GOy'T OF IRELAND, supra note 17, at app.
126 Privacy Act, R.S.B.C. 1996 Ch. 373; Privacy Act, R.S.M. 1987 Ch. P125; Privacy Act,
NFLD. R. S. 1990 Ch. P22; Privacy Act, S.S. 1978 Ch. P-24.
127 See infra notes 148-170 and accompanying text; see also GOy'T OF IRELAND, supra note
17, at'H 6.04(v).
121

122
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proposal integrate the unitary-and multiple-tort approaches, it does this in
a privacy environment bearing similarities to the American context and
with the intent to resolve some of the same issues confronting American
jurisdictions.
A. THE CONTEXT FOR THE IRISH PRIVACY BILL

As in the United States, the protection of privacy in the Irish
Constitution is not explicit. It requires the state to guarantee in its laws to
defend and vindicate the personal rights of the citizen.128 In 1973, the
Irish Supreme Court held that this included rights not enumerated in the
Constitution, including a right to marital privacy.129 Following dictum in
a 1984 Supreme Court judgment, Ireland's High Court in 1987 declared
the existence of a general right to privacy. 130 In 1998 the Supreme Court
held that a plaintiff in a tort action enjoyed a constitutional right to
privacy. 131 Thus, while a tort action under the national constitution is not
available in the United States, it is in Ireland. 132
An additional layer of concern sterns from a provision in the
European Convention on Human Rights stating that, "Everyone has the
right to respect for his family and private life, his home, and his
correspondence." 133 Ireland's European Convention on Human Rights
Act, 2003, requires that Irish statutes be interpreted to give effect to the
Convention and that Irish judges take judicial notice of decisions of the
European Court of Human Rights. l34 The Act requires a state organ to

IR. CONST., 1937, art. 40(3)(1).
McGee v Attorney General, [1974]I.R. 284 (Ir.) (invoking the right to marital privacy to
invalidate a ban on importation of contraceptive preparations).
130 Norris v. Attorney General, [1984] I.R. 36 (lr.) ("It is argued that two personal rights are
infringed, the right to privacy and the right to bodily integrity. That there are such rights has been
established. The extent of these rights has still to be ascertained and will vary according to
circumstances."(citations omitted)); Kennedy & Arnold v. Ireland, [1987] I.R. 587 (H. Ct.) (Ir.)
("Though not specifically guaranteed by the Constitution, the right of privacy is one of the
fundamental personal rights of the citizen which flow form the Christian and democratic nature of
the State."). Note that the High Court functions as an intermediate court of appeal in civil matters.
See IR. CONST., 1937, art. 34(3-4).
131 Haughey v. Moriarty, [1999]3 I.R. I (Ir.) ("There is no doubt but that the plaintiffs enjoy a
constitutional right to privacy.").
132 GOV'T OF IRELAND, supra note 17, at'll 2.38. The Irish Constitution, unlike its American
counterpart, imposes obligations upon its citizens. [d. See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S.
922,928-29 (1982) (holding that invocation of the privacy protections of the federal constitution
requires that an individual be affected by state action); United States v. Stanley, 109 U.S. 3, II
(1883) (stating that the 14th Amendment does not apply to individual invasion of individual rights).
133 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 8.1, Nov.
4, 1950, C.E.T.S. No.5 (hereinafter European Human Rights Convention).
134 European Convention on Human Rights Act, 2003 (Act No. 20/2003) (Jr.), art. 2-4.
128
129
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"perform its functions in a manner compatible with the State's
obligations under the Convention's provisions" 135 and permits, when no
remedy is otherwise available, a suit for damages for anyone who suffers
injury, loss, or damage as a result of the state's failure to act in accord
with the Convention. 136 In 2005, the European Court of Human Rights
ruled in Von Hannover v. Germany that the obligations of a state under
the Convention "may involve the adoption of measures designed to
secure respect for private life even in the sphere of the relations of
individuals between themselves.,,13? The Working Group read Von
Hannover as strongly suggesting that states have a general obligation to
introduce measures to protect privacy.138 The problem for Ireland is that
such protections would be derived from the constitutional guarantees,
which are themselves unclear. 139
Ireland thus faces a challenge familiar to American states: how to
create legal structures that make viable a broadly and amorphously
defined right. Because Ireland's courts have recognized that a plaintiff in
a tort action enjoys a constitutional right to privacy,14O and because the
integration of the European Convention on Human Rights into Ireland's
national law appears to demand considerably more of Ireland than the
concept of a right to privacy demands of American states,141 the analogy
breaks down upon close scrutiny. Nothwithstanding this distinction, in
both countries the challenge of translating the concept of privacy into
forms that will facilitate meaningful litigation persists. The Working
Group observed a number of uncertainties in Ireland, including whether
causes of action are confined to intentional interferences with the
constitutional right, and the extent of defenses available. 142 Partly
stemming from these uncertainties, no case has recognized the
constitutional protection as supporting a remedy beyond an injunction. 143
This led the Working Group to conclude that the constitutional protection
does not "provide a reliable guide by . . . which citizens can predict ...
whether their action will be found in breach of the law."I44
Ireland, only fairly recently willing to recognize a common-law

Id. at art. 3, 'II
at art. 3 'll.2
137
Von Hannover v. Germany, 2004-Vl Eur. Ct. H.R. 294 ..
138 GOy'T OF IRELAND, supra note 17, at'll 3.39.
139 1d. at'll 3.40.
140 Haughey v Moriarty, [1999] 3 I.R. I (Ir.).
141 See supra notes 164-170 and accompanying text.
142 GOy'T OF IRELAND, supra note 17, at'll 2.37.
143 1d. at'll 2.39.
144 Id. at'll 2.42.
135

136 1d.
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right to privacy, has, like the United States, attempted to protect privacy
through ad hoc legislation. 145 These statutes, unlike some of their
American counterparts,146 do not include provisions authorizing
damages. As the Irish Working Group report states, such protections are
piecemeal and do not posit a cause of action for those whose privacy has
been interfered with. 147 Recognizing the inadequacy of this approach,
the Irish government has attempted to create the comprehensive cause of
action that it currently lacks.
B. A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR AN OLD TORT

The Irish Working Group adopted a description of privacy similar to
the one adopted by the Restatement: "The right of the individual to be
protected against intrusion into his personal life or affairs, or those of his
family, by direct physical means or by publication of inforrnation.,,148
Unlike the Restatement, the Irish bill recognizes a single tort for invasion
of privacy. 149 More importantly, though, it envisions a single value that
is breached: the reasonable expectation of privacy. 150
The Irish proposal provides that "the nature and degree of privacy to
which an individual is reasonably entitled to expect [sic] is that which is
reasonable in all the circumstances having regard to the rights of others
and to the requirements of public order, public morality, and the common
good." 151 The Working Group concluded that this definition of the scope
of privacy was a simple, objective test that could be tailored to individual
situations. 152 The requirement of regard for the rights of others, public
order, public morality, and the common good incorporates limitations
raised by the High Court in Cogley v. Radio Telefls Eireann. 153 Cogley
requires that the right to privacy be analyzed in light of these other
considerations; thus, the privacy tort requires a court to perform a
balancing test in determining whether a plaintiff can recover for invasion

145 See, e.g., Adoption Act, 1976 (Act No. 29/1976) (Ir.) (restricting the publication of public
records); Broadcasting Authority (Amendment) Act 1976 (Act No. 37/1976) (Ir.) (requiring state
broadcasters to not encroach unreasonably on an individual's privacy); Data Protection Act 1988
(Act No. 2S/l988) (Ir.) (restricting the maintenance and dissemination of personal data by public and
private entities); see also Gov'T OF IRELAND, supra note 24, at'll 2.19.
146 See supra notes 128-136 and accompanying text.
147 GOV'T OF IRELAND, supra note 17, at'll 2.18.
148 GOV'T OF IRELAND, supra note 17, at'llI.OS.
149
Id. at 'll7 .OS, app. § 2( I).
150
Id. at 'll7 .13, app. § 3( I).
151
1d.
152 1d. at'll 7.14.
153 [200S] IEHC 180 (H. Ct.) (Ir.).
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of privacy. 154 In performing this test, a court is required to consider the
nature of the conduct and the relevant circumstances. ISS
While the tort is actionable without proof of damages, it is limited
by the requirement that the conduct be willful and without lawful
authority or reasonable excuse, as well as its unavailability to corporate
bodies or to the deceased. 156 The willfulness requirement reflects a
decision by the Working Group not to extend the tort to negligent or
inadvertent actions, and the requirement of the absence of lawful
authority or reasonable excuse accommodates the defenses recognized in
the bill. 157
The recognized defenses serve as a further limitation on the
applicability of the tort. These include protection for persons engaged in
the lawful defense of person or property, those acting with authorization
of a statute or pursuant to a court order, and police and public officials
who reasonably believe their acts are within the scope of their official
duties. 158 The bill also recognizes a news gathering defense as well as a
public-interest defense. 159 The news gathering defense is intended to
prevent the privacy tort from encroaching on the freedom of the press
required by the European Convention on Human Rights, while the
public-interest defense is intended to prevent the tort from inhibiting
"legitimate disclosure of wrongdoing."I60 A notable element running
through the police/public-official, news gathering, and public-interest

154

[d.

155 GOy'T OF IRELAND, supra note 17, at'll 7.13, app. § 3(2). The relevant circumstances
include the place where the conduct occurred, the object and occasion of the conduct, the status or
function of the person alleging a breach of privacy, and the purpose for which any material obtained
was intended to be used or was actually used. [d. The conceptual basis for such a balancing test was
explained by Jeremy Bentham in the early nineteenth century.
Jeremy Bentham, THEORY OF
LEGISLATION 93 (Etienne Dumont ed. 1802, translated by R. Hildreth, Trubner & Co., London
1864). ("[T]he law cannot grant a benefit to one without imposing, at the same time, some burden
upon another; or in other words, it is not possible to create a right in favour of one, except by
creating a corresponding obligation imposed upon another. ... The legislator.... [o]ught never to
impose a burden except for the purpose of conferring a benefit of a clearly greater value.").
156 GOy'T OF IRELAND, supra note 17, at '11'117.05,7.07, app. §§ 2(1),2(3), 12.
157 [d. at 'II'lI7 .08, 7.10.
158 [d. at '117.22, app. §§ (I)(a), 6(1)(b-c).
159 [d. at '117.22, app. § 6(1)(d) (requiring that the conduct be performed by a person gathering
news for a newspaper or broadcaster and that such conduct is reasonable and is necessary for or
incidental to newsgathering activities related to a matter of public interest or fair and reasonable
comment on a matter of public interest); [d. at '117.25, app. § 7 (protecting disclosures of material that
is in the public interest or is fair and reasonable comment on a matter of public interest).
160 GOy'T OF IRELAND, supra note 17, at 'II 7.21.
See also European Human Rights
Convention, art. 10.1, ("Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include
freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by
public authorities and regardless of frontiers.").
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defenses is that the conduct must have been reasonable under the
circumstances. 161
The Irish proposal further clarifies the extent of the protection by
incorporating certain recognized breaches of privacy into the statute.
The bill provides that the following, proved by preponderance of the
evidence, are breaches of privacy: surveillance, regardless of the means
employed or whether accomplished by trespass; disclosure of
information obtained through surveillance or harassment; unauthorized
exploitation of the name, likeness, or voice of an identified or
identifiable individual; and the use of letters, diaries, or other personal
documents of an individual. 162 The bill clarifies that this section does not
prejudice the generality of the bill's definition of privacy. 163
The draft bill seeks to enhance clarity and certainty in an area of the
law in which current protections are, as in the United States, a
miscellaneous patchwork. l64 This was motivated in part by a desire to
comply with the requirements of the European Convention on Human
Rights and to better define how citizens might vindicate their
constitutional right to privacy.165 The Working Group was also
concerned, though, with the ability of the case law to respond to
advances in technology.166 The Group viewed a statutorily created
general remedy as the best way to counter the use of technology to
invade privacy, stating that "[s]ectoral legislation dealing with the
different and myriad forms of abuse of technology cannot be constantly
renewed by the legislature to keep up with advances in the
technology.,,167 The Working Group rejected the argument that courts
should be 'allowed to organically develop the breach-of-privacy tort,
instead opting for a statutory cause of action that would clarify the law
and ensure comprehension by lay persons, and that courts could apply in
specific situations. 168
The United States and Ireland are, in many respects, very different
countries. The United States has over 300 million citizens while Ireland

See supra notes 159-160.
162 GOV'T OF IRELAND, supra note 17, at'll 7.17, app. § 4(1 )(a-d).
163 1d. at'll 7.17, app. § 4(1 )(a).
164 Id. at'll 6.04(iii, vi). See also the discussion on American patchwork protections supra,
notes 107 to liS and accompanying text.
165 1d. at 'II 6.04 (vii) (explaining desire to comply with European Convention on Human
Rights); Id. at 'II 6.04 (ii) (explaining to desire to clarify how citizens may protect their privacy
rights).
166 Id. at'll 6.04 (ii).
167 GOV'T OF IRELAND, supra note 17, at 'II 6.04.
168 GOV'T OF IRELAND, supra note 17, at 'II 6.04(v).
161
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has slightly more than four million. 169 While both are democracies,
Ireland lacks structures analogous to American state governments. 170 At
the same time, in both countries the extent of tort law's protection of
privacy is uncertain and is defined by a collection of common-law
doctrines and statutory provisions. The Irish proposal seeks to give
greater definition and clarity to this collection and to provide guidance
for a court's application of the privacy tort to circumstances not
previously encountered. For this reason, and because it was developed
free of the heavy influence of the multiple-tort theory, its benefits are
worthy of consideration in the American context.
IV. BENEFITS OF THE IRISH lNTEGRATNE APPROACH

The benefits offered by the Irish proposal can be divided into two
categories. The first set of benefits is organizational. 171 These are
related to the ability of the proposed statute to embrace a number of
disparate elements and to organize them in a coherent manner. The
second set of benefits is substantive and reflects the ability of the
proposal to clarify the value underlying privacy torts in a manner that
will channel the adaptive power of American common law. 172
A. CLARIFYING AND SIMPLIFYING THE PRNACY TORT

Professor Ruth Gavison argued that legislation should create laws
that are as clear, simple, elegant, and suggestive as possible.173 Elegance
may be more than one can hope for, but a degree of clarity and
simplicity, and perhaps even suggestiveness, seems a reasonable
expectation from a statute. Whatever combination of these factors might
be possible, Gavison argued that they are necessary for the law to
perform its function of guiding behavior, providing a basis for

169 See CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FACTBOOK 2006, 583-86 (2006)
(outlining American government and society); see also id. at 274-77 (doing the same for Irish
government and society).
170 Although Ireland is subdivided into twenty-nine counties and five city councils with
similar powers, their powers do not begin to approach those of American states. Local government
was not constitutionally recognized until the Twentieth Amendment to the Irish Constitution in
1999. See IR. CONST., 1937, art. 28a. Additionally, while county and city councils do conduct their
own elections, they occur pursuant to regulations promulgated by a national government minister,
and their powers are largely determined by acts of the national legislature. See, e.g., Local
Government Act, 2001 (Act No. 3712001) (Ir.) § 27.
171 See infra notes 173-186 and accompanying text.
172 See infra notes 187-207 and accompanying text.
173 See Gavison, supra note 6, at 158.
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evaluating conduct, and educating by serving as a means to internalize
the values of the system. 174
The most obvious way in which the organizational structure of the
Irish proposal advances these principles is by bringing the various
strands of privacy-tort law under the same statutory roof. 175 This
establishes one place where citizens may discover what their rights are
when they feel their privacy has been invaded. 176 As the Working Group
report states, "the encapsulation of a statutory cause of action ... will
allow the legislature to calibrate the tort in a manner that protects the
citizen's rights, while at the same time accommodating countervailing
considerations.,,177
It also simplifies judicial decisionmaking by
streamlining the sources to which a judge must turn. 178 Additionally,
once a legislature has enacted a privacy-tort statute, it then has a readily
available and easily accessible vehicle for future adjustments.
The reunification of the privacy tort would reverse what Edward
Bloustein viewed as one of the fundamental problems with the four-tort
structure: its violation of what he saw as a general principle of science as
applied to the development of the law. 179 He argued that the four-tort
structure "offends the primary canon of all science that a single general
principle of explanation is to be preferred over congeries of discrete
rules.,,180 He added that,
To the degree that relief in the law courts can be explained by a
common rule or principle, to that degree the law has achieved greater
unity and has become a more satisfying and useful tool of
understanding. Conceptual unity is not only fulfilling in itself,
however, it is also an instrument of legal development. 181
In fulfilling this principle, the Irish structure affords a legislature the
Id.
175 I.e., definition, principles for determining breach, defenses, recognized defenses.
176 See GOV'T OF IRELAND, supra note 17, at en 6.04(iii).
177 GOV'T OF IRELAND, supra note 17, at en 6.04(v).
174

A statutory cause of action allows a judge to look to the statute and then the cases
construing and applying it when ruling on a case that falls within the statute's parameters, rather than
having to extrapolate the relevant law from the common law. The efficiency of the Supreme Court
of California's decisionmaking in determining the extent of the state constitution's privacy
protection is a good example of the efficiency that is possible when judges can begin with something
other than the common law. Although not a statute, the constitutional provision was adopted by
referendum and thus bore at least the same deliberative legitimacy that a statute does. See supra
notes 64-67 and accompanying text and infra notes 192-94 and accompanying text.
179 Bloustein, supra note 93, at 963.
17S

ISO

Id.

lSI

Id. at 1004.
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opportunity to make decisions about what will and will not be
incorporated under the statute. Any of the existing four torts might be
incorporated as exemplars of transgressions or left out.
When
Wisconsin, for example, enacted its privacy statute in 1977, its
legislature declined to include the false-light tort. 182 The Wisconsin
Senate deleted a false-light provision when it passed the privacy statute
and declined to reinstate it on two subsequent occasions, in part due to
opposition from the state's communications media. 183 A jurisdiction that
finds that the false-light-publicity tort is too similar to defamation is free
to exclude it, as is a jurisdiction that finds that an independent tort for
misappropriation protects property interests better than the invasion-ofprivacy tort. 184 This would reflect an approach suggested by the
establishment in the Third Restatement of the Law of Unfair Competition
of breach of the right to publicity as a separate tort, independent of its
moorings in privacy. 185
The tort protection of privacy in both the United States and Ireland
is a disparate collection of common-law doctrines and statutory
provisions. 186 A statute of the type proposed in Ireland may not be
elegant, but it does require a legislature to consider and make decisions

182 Right of Privacy Act, ch. 176 § 5, 1977 Wis. Laws 756 (codified at WIS. STAT. § 895.50
(1979». For the legislative history of the statute see Judith Endjean, The Tort of Misappropriation
of Name or Likeness Under Wisconsin's New Privacy Law, 1978 WIS. L. REV. 1029, 1037-40
(1978).
183 S. Amend. 9 to Wis. A.B. 216 (1977) (discussed in Jacqueline Hanson Dee, The Absence
of False Light From the Wisconsin Privacy Statute, 66 MARQ. L. REV. 99, 101 (1983»; Right of
Privacy Act, ch. 176 § 5, 1977 Wis. Laws 756 (codified at WIS. STAT. § 895.50 (1979». For the
two failed attempts to reinstate the false-light tort, see Wis. A.B. 1224 (1979); and Wis. A.B. 40
(1981). See also Dee, supra note 6, at 101, for a discussion of the politics behind the debates on the
false-light provision.
184 See Denver Publ'g Co. v. Bueno, 54 P.3d 893, 894 (Colo. 2002) ("[W]e now decline to
recognize the tort, concluding that it is highly duplicative of defamation .... "); Lake v. Wal-Mart
Stores, 582 N.W.2d 231, 236 (Minn. 1998) ("[W]e are not persuaded that a new cause of action
should be recognized if little additional protection is afforded plaintiffs."); Cain v. Hearst Corp., 878
S.W.2d 577, 582 (Tex. 1994) (rejecting false-light invasion of privacy); Renwick v. News &
Observer Publ'g Co., 312 S.E.2d 405, 410 (N.c. 1984); J. Thomas McCarthy, THE RIGHTS OF
PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY 2006, § 5.12(C) (2006) ("[Clourts have yet to draw a clear and distinct line
between this category of 'privacy' and that of defamation law."). The misappropriation tort's
protection of a property-like interest has long been grounds for criticism. Harry Kalven argued that
the appropriation aspect of Warren and Brandeis's 1890 article was "petty." Privacy in Tort Law:
Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 326,330 (1966). Others have
criticized the linking of misappropriation to a property, rather than an "inviolate personality" or
"dignity," interest. See Bloustein, supra note 109, at 971; Andrew J. McClurg, A Thousand Words
are Worth a Picture: A Privacy Tort Response to Consumer Data Profiling, 98 Nw. U. L. REv. 63,
III (2003).
185 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 (1995).
186 See supra notes 26-80,107-116,128-147 and accompanying text.
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that will bring some order and clarity that the current arrangements
cannot provide. This, in turn, will allow citizens to better understand
what the tort does and does not protect. By clarifying, in particular, the
extent to which the current common-law torts are subsumed into the
newly unified tort, a legislature can clarify the privacy landscape in a
manner that allows a jurisdiction to avail itself of the proposal's
substantive benefits.
B. LINKING THE RE-FORMED TORT TO A CENTRAL VALUE

The process by which the Irish proposal will achieve its intended
end is necessarily a political process. 187 It requires a legislature to
confront fundamental questions related to the protection of privacy,
including what the term "privacy" is to mean, what kind of defenses will
be permitted, and what acknowledged transgressions will be integrated
into the statute. 188 While this necessarily involves concern about the
impact of special interests, it also raises the possibility of expanding the
base of parties who contribute to defining the contours of the tort. 189
Case law develops in response to the facts of individual cases, which
depend in large part upon those who can afford to bring or defend
claims. 190 Legislators, however, are responsible to constituents, both as
individuals and as members of special-interest groupS.191 As a result, the
statutory route offers the possibility of a privacy tort supported by greater

187 As in the United States, for the Privacy Bill to be enacted into law it must be passed by
majorities of both houses of the legislature and signed by the President. IR. CONST., 1937, art. 25(1).
Although the Irish President is generally apolitical and does not have a veto power, the very nature
of parliamentary government, especially when the government holds power by virtue of a coalition
agreement, is inherently political. See IR. CONST., 1937, art. 13(3)(2); infra note 197. This is
exemplified by the absence of any activity on the Privacy Bill after its initial introduction in the
legislature. See infra notes 195-197 and accompanying text.
188 The Working Group Report addresses all these concerns. See GOv'T OF IRELAND, supra
note 17, at 'II 7.05-27. A legislature undertaking to develop a statute based upon the report must
necessarily make judgments on the conclusions the report reaches in each of these areas.
189 1d. at 'II 6.04(iii).
190 Id. at 'II 6.04(iii) (quoting GOV'T OF IRELAND, LAW REFORM COMMISSION REPORT ON
PRlV ACY (LRC 57 -1998) 'II 1.31).
191 See THE FEDERALIST No. 57, at 367 (James Madison) (Robert Scigliano ed., 2001)
("[TJhey will be compelled to anticipate the moment when their power is to cease, when their
exercise of it is to be reviewed, and when they must descend to the level from which they were
raised; there forever to remain unless a faithful discharge of their trust shall have established their
title to a renewal of it."); Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes.
65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845, 858 (1992) ("Congress is a bureaucratic organization ... generating
legislation through complicated, but organized, processes of interaction with other institutions and
groups, including executive branch departments, labor unions, business organizations, and public
interest groups.").
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legitimacy and acceptance.
Beyond greater legitimacy, the Irish statute offers the potential to
anchor privacy to a reasonably well-articulated value. When the
Supreme Court of California was confronted with the issue of whether
the state constitution's privacy protection provided a tort cause of action
in White v. Davis, it turned, as noted earlier, to a brochure distributed on
behalf of the initiative through which the language was adopted. 192
Finding language in the brochure indicating intent to create a tort cause
of action to protect citizens against invasions of their privacy, the court
recognized the constitutional privacy tort. 193 The court's analysis was
simplified because the brochure effectively functioned as the initiative's
legislative history. 194 With a statute, the citizenry and eventually the
legislature will presumably set out a more extensive legislative history
than the brochure analyzed in White. This process has already begun in
Ireland, where there has been considerable public debate about the
efficacy of the government proposal. The Irish Journalists Union leapt to
protest, arguing that the proposed tort was too onerous with respect to
their work and that it would serve as an unexpected curb on free
speech. 195 Others raised the concern that the tort was only about the
protection of politicians and the famous. 196 The question whether the
government can convince the public that the codification of the invasionof-privacy tort benefits the ordinary Irish citizen will ultimately be
answered in Ireland's Oireachtas (legislature).197

192 White v. Davis, 533 P.2d 222, 233-34 (Cal. 1975).
accompanying text.
193 White, 533 P.2d at 234.
194 Id..

See also supra notes 64-67 and

195 See Deaglan de Breadun, Legislation Premature and Poorly Drafted, Seminar Told, IRISH
TIMES (Dublin), September 18,2006, at 5.
196 See Editorial, Privacy and the Public Interest, IRISH TIMES (Dublin), September 19, 2006,
at 19.
197 The proposed statute was introduced in Ireland's Seanad (Senate) on July 7,2006. Privacy
Bill 2006 (Bill 4412006) (Ir.). On April 29, 2007, the Irish President dissolved the 29th Dail (lower
house of the legislature) and the 22nd Seanad and called a general election for May 24, 2007. Press
Release, Houses of the Oireachtas, Dail General Election: 24 May 2007; 30th Dail to meet on 14
June 2007 (April 30, 2007) (available from Houses of the Oireachtas website) at http:
http://www.oireachtasjelviewdoc.asp?DocID=7705&&CatID=36. That election saw the Fianna Fail
party of Taioseach (prime minister) Bertie Ahern, whose government introduced the Privacy Bill,
gain the largest share of seats, though not a majority, in the 30th Dail. Stephen Collins, Outcome
Far Closer Than Most Had Predicted, IRISH TIMES (Dublin), May 28, 2007, at 2. When the 30th
Dail convened on June 14, 2007, Fianna Fail, formed a coalition with the Green Party and the
Progressive Democrats party that represents a majority of the seats in the Dail. As a result, Bertie
Ahern was reelected Taioseach. Stephen Collins and Mark Hennessey, Ahern Gives Greens Two
Top Ministries in Cabinet, IRISH TIMES (Dublin), June 15, 2007, at I. In a uniquely Irish quirk,
voting for the Seanad does not occur concurrently with voting for the Dail, but within ninety days of
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While White and the initial public debate in Ireland illuminate some
of the benefits of a unitary-tort approach, problems can arise when
guidance to courts is ill-developed. Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic
Association, which also derived from California's constitutional tort,
involved a challenge by Stanford University athletes to the legality of the
NCAA's drug-testing program. 198
In an effort to clarify the
constitutional cause of action, the Supreme Court of California, left with
no guidance from the referendum campaign, instead turned to a tortured
analysis of California and federal cases, as well as the literature on the
right of privacy going back to Warren and Brandeis. 199 In response, the
court developed a two-tiered framework of analysis. If a case involves
the obvious invasion of a fundamental interest, such as freedom from
involuntary sterilization or freedom to pursue consensual family
relationships, a compelling interest is required to overcome the vital
privacy interest. 2OO If the privacy interest is less central, or in bona fide
dispute, a general balancing test is used. 201 In an opinion that included,
among other things, a discussion of the configuration of urinals in a
men's bathroom, the court upheld the NCAA's drug-testing program, in
part because fair competition was a legitimate interest and because there
was a diminished expectation of privacy on the part of the Stanford
athletes. 202 This holding was rebuked in a dissent by Justice Stanley
Mosk. 203 In addition to offering further musings on the reasonable
expectation of privacy in a locker-room bathroom, he challenged the
two-tiered analysis as unsupported by the text of the state constitution
and the history of the referendum that yielded the amendment. 204 Setting
aside the issue of the wisdom behind the decision, it shows that a vaguely

the dissolution of the lower house. IR. CONST., 1937, art. 18(8). Voting for the Seanad took place
on July 23-24, 2007, and the new Seanad convened on September 13, 2007. See Press Release,
Department of the Environment, Heritage, & Local Government, Seanad General Election (May 5,
2007) (available from the Department of Environment, Heritage, & Local Government website) at
http://www.environ.ie/enlLocaIGovernmentlVoting/News/MainBody.5131.en.htm; 187 Seanad Deb.
Proclamation Summoning Seanad Eireann (September 13, 2007) (available from the Houses of the
Oireachtas website) at http://debates.oireachtas.ielXm1l30/ SEN20070913.PDF. See also Michael
O'Regan, Seanad Poll Count Begins Today, IRISH TIMES (Dublin), July 23, 2007, at 7; Jimmy
Walsh, Ross Stresses Need for Reform as New Cathaoirleach Elected, IRISH TIMES (Dublin),
September 14,2007, at 13. To date, the Privacy Bill has not been re-introduced in either house of
the legislature and the new coalition government has given no indication whether it will be.
198 Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, 865 P.2d 633, 641 (Cal. 1994).
199 ld. at 646-657.
200 ld. at 653.
201
1d.
203

Id. at 655-56.
Hill, 865 P.2d at 679-81.

204

Id.

202
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drawn privacy tort cedes to a court considerable interpretive latitude.
The legislation proposed by the Irish Government offers the
opportunity to embrace the more clarifying aspects of the California
experience while dispensing with some of the more confusing aspects
manifested in Hill. The proposed statute establishes a privacy tort and
clarifies the requirements for such a cause of action, thus avoiding the
tortured discourse of the Hill decision. 205 In addition, the sections that
spell out obvious breaches of privacy and clarify the available defenses
afford opportunities for further delineation of what is and is not
actionable. 206 Most importantly, legislative debate requires identification
of what is at stake, with hopefully greater specificity than seen in
California. 207 Here again, though, actual adoption of a statutory tort will
establish the act itself as a primary source of authority, with the record of
the debates a secondary source only where the text of the act is silent or
unclear.
V. RECONSTRUCTING THE AMERICAN PRN ACY TORT

The employment of a statute resembling the Irish proposal is much
more than an effort to codify the unifying principle claimed to be
nonexistent by Prosser but acknowledged by Bloustein and others. 208 It
would also embrace the development of privacy-tort law that has
occurred in the last four decades. In so doing, a jurisdiction could
reorient its privacy litigation away from an overly elemental approach
toward one based upon a broader consideration of what society is
prepared to protect under the banner of privacy.
A. STATUTORY UNIFICATION AND CLARIFICATION OF THE SCOPE OF
PROTECTION

The Irish proposal is an exercise in both the general and the
specific. The right protected is articulated broadly, but the proposal
provides greater specificity regarding defenses and the list of recognized
transgressions. 209 The inevitable temptation with such a structure would
be to announce a general cause of action for invasion of privacy and then
include in a list of acknowledged transgressions the existing four torts,

See supra
See supra
207 See supra
208 See supra
209 See supra
205

206

notes 148-163 and accompanying text.
notes 158-163 and accompanying text.
notes 64-67, 192-204, and accompanying text.
notes 49-56, 93-98 and accompanying text.
notes 148-163 and accompanying text.
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and perhaps some of the mini-torts discussed above. 2IO This might very
well amount to an exercise hardly worth the effort required. This is not,
however, what the Irish proposal does.
First, with respect to the list of violations, two of the acknowledged
violations-disclosure of information and use of name, likeness or
voice-sound very much like the Restatement torts of public disclosure
of private facts and misappropriation. 211 The other two acknowledged
violations, though, represent two considerations-surveillance and the
use of letters, diaries, and other personal documents-that do not fit
conveniently into the Prosser typology. 212 In an American context, the
temptation to include Prosser torts in such a section would likely be
irresistible. On the other hand, misappropriation, for instance, might be
set off on its own, or false-light publicity might be spun off of the
privacy branch of tort law to live as an aspect of defamation. 213 Looking
forward, a jurisdiction might include the unauthorized dissemination of
private personal information and unleash the privacy tort on those who
traffic in personal information. 214 Similarly, the incorporation of some of
the statutorily created tort actions would further define the contours of
the privacy protection. 215
The enumeration of acknowledged
transgressions offers an opportunity both to integrate existing torts into
the broader structure envisioned by the statute and to address methods
that are obvious violations. While this structure also offers a ready-made
format for the incorporation of future privacy intrusions into the tort,216 it
also runs the risk of being so extensively used that it winds up being
simply a slightly better organized version of the existing structure or a
glorified Restatement blessed with the imprimatur of legislative
approval.
The avoidance of such an outcome rests in the feature that makes
the proposal worthwhile: its definition of privacy. The articulated cause
of action simply states that it is a tort to willfully violate the privacy of
another. 217 It then provides that the "nature and degree of privacy to
See supra notes 107-115 and accompanying text.
211 See GOV'T OF IRELAND, supra note 17, at'll 7.17, app. § 4(l)(a-b). See also supra notes
210

66-67.

'lI 7.17, app. §§ 4(l)(a), 4(l)(d).
See supra note 184-185.
214 The willfulness requirement would act as a limitation on such employment of the statute,
making it applicable to those who knowingly disseminate personal information, not those who do so
negligently.
215 E.g., incorporation into the statute of the tort action for intercepting wireless
communications.
216 GOVERNMENT OF IRELAND, supra note 17, at'll 6.04(iv).
217 A jurisdiction might be tempted to delete the willfulness requirement to make it more
212 [d.
213
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which an individual is reasonably entitled to expect [sic] is that which is
reasonable in all the circumstances .... ,,218 The statute also includes
factors to consider in determining what is. reasonable. 219 The most
important element of the definition, though, so much so that it appears
twice within nine words, is the element of reasonability.22o
B. ORIENTING PRIVACY AROUND THE REASONABLE EXPECTATION

Objective elements in general, and the element of reasonability in
particular, are not absent in American privacy-tort law. An objectively
reasonable expectation of privacy is a prerequisite for the intrusion-uponseclusion tort. 221 The public-disc1osure-of-private-facts tort does not
expressly require a reasonable expectation of privacy, but it does require
that the disclosure be offensive?22 One might argue that all the elements
of each of the four torts are geared toward determining the reasonable
expectation of privacy, but the elements of the four torts make clear that
they are generally geared toward fulfillment of required elements, not a
consideration of the totality of the circumstances. Indeed, Prosser denies
the existence of a unifying concept of privacy, so it is logical that there
would not be a coherent definition. 223 Privacy is different in the
misappropriation context than in the intrusion-up on-seclusion context. 224
This suggests that privacy litigation has become almost an exercise in
code pleading in which the focus is on the fulfillment of specific
technical requirements rather than on the vindication of an established
and recognized right.
The Irish proposal decouples privacy from such a method of
litigation by positing a one-to-one correspondence between concept and

useful against, e.g., information traffickers. The problem with this is that it would thereby transform
the invasion-of-privacy tort into a negligence cause of action.
218 GOy'T OF IRELAND, supra note 17, at'll 7.13, app. § 3(1).
219
[d. at'll 7.13, app. § 3(2).
220 [d. 'lI 7.13, app. § 3(1). (" ... the nature and degree of privacy to which an individual is
reasonably entitled to expect [sic] is that which is reasonable in all the circumstances" (emphasis
added)).
221 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977).
222 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977).
223 See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
224 Compare supra notes 53 and 56. By their very terms, the intrusion tort is a breach of
one's seclusion while the misappropriation tort protects a breach of one's ability to use or benefit
from one's name or likeness. Compare also supra notes 53 with notes 54 and 55. The act giving
rise to the intrusion tort is complete upon the breach of another's solitude while the false-lightpublicity and the disclosure-of-private-facts torts require publicity of a private matter before the tort
is complete.
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cause of action. 225 This construct by itself, though, is merely a
manifestation of form. The substance stems from the linkage to the
reasonable expectation of privacy, which places that consideration at the
core of privacy litigation; moreover, that determination is placed in the
hands of a judge or jury. Including an act among the enumerated
violation, therefore, must reflect a judgment that the act breaches a
reasonable expectation of privacy. This means, for instance, that the
listing of misappropriation among the acknowledged violations, as in the
Irish proposal,226 clarifies that what is breached in that act is privacy, and
not a vague conception of a property interest. The structure of the
proposal makes clear that consideration of the reasonable expectation of
privacy is paramount.
The use of such a standard with respect to privacy is not without its
inherent limitations. The Irish proposal contains a number of defenses
that will bar recovery regardless of whether a reasonable expectation was
breached. 227 An American jurisdiction need not accept these defenses
summarily, but they do mirror defenses that have been invoked in the
United States. 228 Additionally, no amount of statutory craftsmanship can
avoid the impact of the United States Supreme Court's First Amendment
jurisprudence. 229 While a well-constructed statute cannot overcome the
First Amendment, a state can statutorily create more privacy rights in
those areas that fall within its powers, which Massachusetts and
California did by broadening the cause of action. 230
In addition to these limitations, cases from the Canadian provinces

225 The Irish proposal is grounded in the notion that it is the responsibility of the legislature to
craft causes of actions to be enjoyed by citizens. Gov'T OF IRELAND, supra note 17, at'll 6.04(i). The
Working Group Report perceived that a dedicated cause of action to protect the constitutionally
protected right to privacy did not exist, and so it recommended that the legislature create one. [d. at
'116.05.
226
[d. at'll 7.17, app. § 4(l)(c).
227 These defenses include acts required by law or court order, acts performed by a police
officer or officer of the state reasonably perceived to be within the scope of the officer's official
duties, acts of reasonable news gathering on a matter of public interest, and acts of fair and
reasonable comment on a matter of public interest. /d. '117.22, app. § 6(1)(a-d).
228 One who is required to publish matter is absolutely privileged to publish it when it
represents an invasion of privacy. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 592A (1977). A public
officer acting within the scope of his duties is generally immune from tort liability. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 895D (1979). The publication of matter reporting on a public meeting is
privileged if it is accurate and complete or a fair abridgment. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
611 (1977). The contours of America's newsworthiness privilege are murky and vary from state to
state. See, e.g., Campbell v. Seabury Press, 614 F.2d 395, 397 (5th Cir. 1980); McCabe v. Village
Voice, Inc., 550 F. SUpp. 525, 530 (E.D. Pa. 1982); J.e. v. WALA-TV Inc., 675 So.2d 360, 362
(Ala. 1996); see also supra notes 119-120 and accompanying text.
229 See supra notes 119-120 and accompanying text.
230 See supra notes 62-67, 71-75 and accompanying text.
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employing statutes similar to the one proposed in Ireland strongly
suggest that the balancing of the interests of the plaintiff against those of
the defendant erects a fairly high bar for a claim to clear. 231 The interest
of a defendant in broadcasting information of public interest, the health
of employees, and the interest in retrieving documents from a company
computer all have been sufficient to overcome a plaintiff's interest in
privacy. 232 The provincial courts have also tended to construe narrowly
a plaintiff's expectation of privacy in public acts, as well as the definition
of "willful.,,233 These cases suggest that a jurisdiction seeking to tip the
scales in favor of plaintiffs would have to take steps to do so, such as by
including surveillance among the listed violations or by making explicit
statements about the scope of the protection it seeks to provide.
The Canadian cases also reveal a method of deciding cases that is
free of the strictures of the multiple-tort approach. In Genetjanc v.
Brentwood College Association, a high school student whose headmaster
entered his home was awarded $2,500 in general damages in a decision
that balanced the student's significant interest in the privacy of his home
against the headmaster's insufficient interest in determining whether the
plaintiff and other students were present. 234 In Rideout v. Health
Labrador Corp., by certifying a class action that included privacy claims
based on the allegedly improper release of medical information, the court
simply analyzed the plaintiffs' and defendant's interests, and whether the
alleged act was willful. 235 In both cases the core analysis was a

See supra notes 153-155 and accompanying text.
The broadcasting of information of public interest overcame a plaintiffs right to privacy in
Hollinsworth v. BCTV, [1999] 6 W.W.R. 54 (dismissing plaintiffs privacy claim and holding that
broadcast of plaintiff undergoing surgery to correct baldness was in public interest); and Doe v.
Canadian Broad. Corp., [1994] 86 B.C.L.R.2d 216 (declining to bar broadcast of interview tapes
because plaintiff s interest in protecting pri vate facts did not outweigh public interest in integrity of
newsgathering process). The need to protect the health of employees overcame a plaintiff s right to
privacy in Peters-Brown v. Regina District Health Board [1996] I W.W.R. 337, affd on other
grounds [1997]1 W.W.R. 638 (holding that hospital was entitled to inform staff that plaintiff patient
previously suffered from hepatitis by publishing list in laboratories and emergency department to
which general public did not have access). In Pacific Northwest Herb Corp. v. Thompson, [1999]
B.C.J. No. 2272, the right to access private documents was sufficient to forestall an injunction to
enjoin an employee from accessing personal documents on a company-owned computer used by
defendant in his home.
233 See Druken v. R.G. Fewer & Assocs. Inc., [1998] Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 312 (holding video
surveillance of plaintiff and child in yard readily visible to passersby did not violate Privacy Act);
Silber v. British Columbia Television Broad. Co., [1985] 25 D.L.R.4th 345 (dismissing breach of
privacy action arising from videotaping of events occurring in parking lot visible to passers by); see
also Peters-Brown, supra note 232 (holding that "willful" requires more than intentional behavior; it
requires an intent to violate the plaintiff s privacy).
234 Genetjanc v. Brentwood Coil. Assn., [2001] B.C.S.C. 822, 'Il'll17-26.
235 Rideout v. Health Labrador Corp., [2005]2005 NLTD 116, 'Il'll50-65.
231

232
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balancing of the parties' interests, leading to damages and certification of
a class to pursue a claim that would likely be outside the American four
tort structure. 236 Such an approach would free privacy tort from the
elemental constraints of the four torts and allow application of the
privacy tort to circumstances not generally permitted by the Restatement
elements. 237
This orientation of privacy litigation to the reasonable expectation
of privacy offers the possibility of simplifying privacy litigation. It does
not change, however, the fundamental requirement of proving one's case
by a preponderance of the evidence. 238 A plaintiff would still need to
convince a judge or jury that he or she had an expectation of privacy
society regards as reasonable that had been breached. 239 Similar
approaches have been seen with respect to negligence 240 and Fourth
Amendment search-and-seizure privacy?41 To the extent that the change

236

Rideout, [2005] 2005 NLTD 116, 'Il'II 57-63, 140; Genetjane. [2001] B.C.S.C. 822. 'Il'II 22-

26.36.
237 Andrew McClurg suggests, e.g .• that one of the chief obstacles to the application of the
appropriation tort to consumer data profiling is the limitation of the ton to appropriation of name or
likeness only. McClurg, supra note 229. at 141. The Irish statute suggests, however, that the central
inquiry should be the consumer's reasonable expectation of privacy in the information balanced
against the interests of the defendant in his action. GOY'T OF IRELAND, supra note 22, at app. § 3( I).
While the recognized violation in the Irish statute is limited to appropriation of name, likeness, or
voice, these provisions are without prejudice to the statute's broad definition of privacy. [d. at 'II
7.17, app. § 4(1).
238 See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
239 See supra notes 151-154 and accompanying text.
240 Trimarco v. Klein, 56 N.Y.2d 98, 105 (N.Y. 1982) ("It must bear on what is reasonable
conduct under all the circumstances, the quintessential test of negligence."); Freeman v. Adams, 218
P. 600, 60 I (Cal. Ct. App. 1923) ("In determining what a reasonable and prudent man would do
under the circumstances you will remember that presumably a jury is composed of such reasonable
and prudent persons .... "); Vaughan v. Menlove, (1837) 132 Eng. Rep. 490 (C.P.) ("[w]e ought
rather to adhere to the rule which requires in all cases a regard to caution such as a man of ordinary
prudence would observe."); Hall v. Brooklands Auto Racing Club (1933) I K.B. 205 (Eng.) ("The
reasonable man has been described as .. .'the man in the street' or 'the man in the Clapham omnibus,'
or. .. the man who takes the magazines at home, and in the evening pushes the lawnmower in his shin
sleeves."'); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 283 (1964) ("Unless the actor is a child, the
standard of conduct to which he must conform... is that of a reasonable man under the
circumstances.").
241 See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 926 (1984) (declining to apply the exclusionary
rule to evidence seized in objectively reasonable reliance on an invalid search warrant); Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (Fourth Amendment protection
requires "that the expectation [of privacy] be one that society is prepared to recognize as
'reasonable."'); United States v. Tibolt, 72 F.3d 965, 969 (1st. Cir. 1995) ("Probable cause will be
found to have been present if the officers ... possessed reasonably trustworthy information sufficient
to warrant a prudent policeman in believing that a criminal offense had been or was being
committed."); United States v. Bennett, 905 F.2d 931,934 (6th Cir. 1990) (defining probable cause
as "reasonable grounds for belief, supported by less than prima facie proof but more than mere
suspicion.").
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contemplated would compel litigants to make a connection between their
position and what society expects, privacy-tort law may more efficiently
and more fairly fulfill the goals of tort law to vindicate individual rights
and to deter socially unacceptable behavior. 242
If the privacy tort were tied to a more elastic understanding of the
protection it offers, courts would be better able to apply the tort to a
range of circumstances beyond those contemplated by the four torts. The
idea of privacy, tort or otherwise, has always been conditioned by the
challenges posed by changes in society, including the development of
technology,243 but it is unreasonable to expect privacy-tort jurisprudence
to continue to meet challenges with a rigid, almost five-decade-old
structure.
The impact of technology on privacy is not a new concern. Warren
and Brandeis in 1890 decried the impact of "instantaneous photographs"
and "numerous mechanical devices" that threatened to make private
matters public. 244 Over eight decades later, in 1971, Professor Arthur R.
Miller contemplated the impact of computer technology on privacy.245
More recently, Miller considered the implications of cookies, electronic
commerce, and the collection and dissemination of personal
information. 246 In the not-too-distant future he might reasonably
contemplate the widespread availability of imagery from high-resolution
satellite cameras in real time in addition to a range of threats that are as
beyond our imagination now as identity theft was a generation ago.
The ability of the common law to respond to such threats is unclear.
Matthew Keck argued that his proposed information-privacy tort was an
extension of the common law, but its narrow applicability to internet
privacy quickly begins to bear a striking resemblance to the piecemeal
protections discussed earlier. 247 Professor Jessica Litman, looking to the
invasion-of-privacy tort to protect personal information, concluded that it

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 901(c) (1979).
See Gonnley, supra note 45, at 1434, 1440
244 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 29, at 213.
245 ARTHUR R. MILLER, AsSAULT ON PRIVACY: COMPUTERS, DATA BANKS AND DOSSIERS
10-16 (1971).
246 Alison Bass, Miller's Privacy Warning, CIO MAGAZINE, November 2001, available at
http://www.cio. comJarchive/llOlOl/miller.htmi.
247 Matthew Keck, Cookies, the Constitution, and the Common Law: A Framework for the
Right of Privacy on the Internet, 13 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 83, 107-116 (2002). Considerations
relevant to Keck's proposed tort are the reasonable expectation of privacy, the purpose of the
transfer of information, the nature of the information, and the seriousness of the violation. Id. at 116.
See also supra notes 107-115 and accompanying text for a discussion of American piecemeal
protections.
242

243
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was too narrowly defined to serve its purpose. 248 The ongoing march of
technology and society seems likely to render the existing structure less
effective. If the real-time satellite imagery scenario contemplated above
comes to pass, rather than having the success of a privacy-tort claim
hinge on whether a plaintiff files an intrusion or a private-facts claim, the
reasonable-expectation construct would allow a court to evaluate the
facts against what society may reasonably be expected to protect and
then rule accordingly. This application of established norms to emerging
contexts is the core of the development of the common law. 249 It is what
Hieu Smith expected of that federal court in Colorado in 1990, and it is
what the privacy tort created by the Irish proposal offers. 250 Because of
this, the Irish proposal portends the possibility of a more resilient privacy
tort than that which is currently available.
VI. CONCLUSION

Legislation may seem an odd method for strengthening a commonlaw tort. The impact of the Restatement, though, has stunted the ability
of the common law to do this with respect to privacy?51 If the drafters of
the Restatement intended that their work would facilitate an ongoing
engagement that would serve to further develop tort protections of
privacy, this aspiration remains unfulfilled. Rather than defining the
current core of privacy-tort law, the four torts have come to largely
define its parameters.
The four-tort structure has, therefore, become a self-fulfilling
prophecy. By denying a central value to the invasion-of-privacy tort and
conceiving of it as a loose federation of four torts, the framework has
necessitated the creation of new torts for breaches of privacy that fall
outside the four-tort structure. 252 Each new tort, in turn, furthers the
notion that tort protection of privacy can only be accomplished by a
series of piecemeal protections. As this occurs, though, it undermines
the viability of privacy as an independent concept by diffusing the
248 Jessica Litman, Information Privacy/Information Property, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1283, 130204 (2000); see also Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REV.
1609,1634 (1999) (arguing that common-law limitations render state tort laws a weak response to
electronic threats to information privacy); Robert Gellman, Does Privacy Law Work?, in
TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY: THE NEW LANDSCAPE 193, 209-212 (Phillip E. Agre & Marc
Rotenberg eds., 1997) (concluding tort remedies do not adequately address privacy concerns with
respect to computer technology).
249 See supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
250 See supra notes 148-160 and accompanying text.
251
. text.
See supra notes 81-1 27 and accompanying
252 See supra notes 49-56,107-115 and accompanying text.
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protections the law provides across an increasing number of torts. This,
in turn, necessitates a dependence on legislatures to keep up with new
invasions of privacy through the enactment of new torts to cover them. 253
The Irish proposal offers a framework that strengthens the identity
of privacy as an independent, relevant tort concept by establishing a
single privacy tort and defining it according to reasonable expectations
under prevailing circumstances. 254 This anchors privacy-tort law to an
understanding similar to that to which constitutional search-and-seizure
privacy law is grounded, or to another legislatively determined value. 255
Additionally, by allowing for integration of developments of the
common law into the statute, the Irish proposal creates a ready-made
framework for the confrontation of new privacy invasions by allowing a
cause of action to be based on whether the new invasion breaches a
reasonable expectation of privacy.256 This relieves legislatures of the
need to keep up with new challenges to privacy. The Irish statute offers
courts a unified, clear articulation of the invasion-of-privacy tort that is
elastic enough to incorporate the common law and channel its tort
protection of privacy to a more effective future.

ROBERT M. CONNALLON*

See supra notes 107-115 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 148-155 and accompanying text.
255 See supra notes 100-102, 240 and accompanying text.
256 See supra notes 148-155 and accompanying text.
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